Originally posted on sciy.org by Ron Anastasia on Fri 06 Oct 2006 02:05 PM PDT
Russia Profile.org
Looking at Russia’s Conflict with Georgia From All Sides
What is going on in Georgia? Answering this question means that we have
to know what is going on in Russia. But first, a substantial proviso,
about comrade Mikheil Saakashvili. Well, never mind the “comrade†bit.
The young chieftain has succeeded in doing something for his country:
He has swept the political trash out of rebellious Batumi, driven the
upstart Aslan Abashidze out of the country, and refused to allow in the
frostbitten Igor Giorgadze. But the further you go, the more
Saakashvili’s inadequate regime has a whiff of Gamsakhurdianism – a
cheap mix of theatrical gesture, gamesmanship, pettiness, myopia, and
self-obsession born of a persecution complex. The unexplained death of
Zurab Zhvania, his one genuinely strong competitor; an epidemic of
arrests among the opposition; continual provocation of the already
excitable leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; boorish behavior
toward Russia cloaked in a fox’s smile; arresting suspected military
officers and following through with the audacious surrounding of the
Russian headquarters in Tbilisi using force of arms… all of these are
links in the same chain – a chain of Saakashvili’s mistakes leading
Georgia into a politically blind alley, a historical morass that I fear
even NATO won’t be able to drag them out of. And
for this reason, I – as a citizen, as a spectator – would be ready to
support any rationally harsh measures in answer to the Georgian
provocation. Reciprocal arrests of spies (real or imagined, it doesn’t
really matter) in double or even triple quantities – you give us four
arrested men, we’ll kick out 12 of yours. Summon the ambassador or seek
a UN Security Council resolution or at least a statement by the
Secretary General. If there are suspicions that a Georgian political
high-flier is conducting his financial affairs in Russia, either
directly or through middlemen, then freeze his accounts and stop all
payments. Not enough? Well, we can at least do these things without
causing a backlash that harms ourselves. But everything that started
last week and continued this week has less and less to do with the
state of Georgia, and more and more to do with the state of Russia.
Embassy staff have been evacuated, as if Tbilisi were Saigon; air
communications have been cut, as if Georgia were Somalia; visas are no
longer being issued to anyone, even on humanitarian grounds; children
of Georgian citizens have been ordered out of the Russian school at the
Embassy; a casino in Moscow was suddenly discovered to belong to a
Georgian criminal boss, and a Georgian cultural center to be flouting
hygiene laws, while Georgian restaurants aren’t paying their taxes.
Even a group of Georgian hitmen was suddenly found and arrested. All
thanks to the upstart Saakashvili – if he hadn’t given the idiotic
order to surround our headquarters, these killers would have continued
to walk free.
Inveterate liberals take a purely humanistic view of all this: It’s a
shame for the poor neighbor that we’re behaving like this; what does
the well-meaning Zurab Tsereteli – who either had shares in the
Kristall casino, or the right to rent it – have to do with anything?
But let’s look at this frankly and soberly. The Georgians will
eventually deal with their own problems. That is their affair, their
worry – whether to continue to support Saakashvili, whether to refuse
to do business in Russia, whether to put pressure on their politicians
to be more amenable, whether to humbly beg the United States to save
them. Even more absurd is to feel pity for the owners of Kristall and
Golden Palace. We should look at what is going on from a different
point of view, from another – pardon me – selfish position, by asking
how the reaction of our chieftains to the Georgian provocation will
affect our own lot; what changes it will lead to in domestic politics,
and only then make our own assessment.
The most obvious – but not most important – consequence of the
decisions that have been made is that the configuration of strength
among the “elites†has been changed at a stroke. Those who had staked
on one successor have moved over; those who bet on the other have
livened up.
Their animation is not factitious, as the guarantor of the constitution
immediately reminded everyone, he alone rules the roost at home, and we
all know what his name is. Here I mean Putin’s double-edged statement –
on the one hand, Georgian nationalism was labelled quasi-terrorism,
while on the other hand Russia is continuing to withdraw its troops and
close bases in accordance with the agreement. The final step on the
road to a small victorious war has not been taken. And everyone is
clear about whose personal decision that is.
The second consequence is also obvious, although more substantial.
Georgia has only put on a show of force; Russia could apply it.
The third consequence is that a start has been made on full-scale
repartition of the legal and criminal markets across the country.
Feeling sorry for the Georgian mafia is a bit stupid – let them feel
sorry for themselves. But, first, the clean-up of the field is
indiscriminate – no-one will bother distinguishing mafia from
non-mafia; peaceful Georgian traders will simply be driven out of
business, or made to pay over the odds. And, secondly, in place of the
cleaned-out mafia we will instantly have a spotless, transparent,
conscientious market system! But we all know that’s not going to
happen. There will be a new redistribution of settled spheres of
influence. The authorities will push out the Georgians; and Azeri or
Chechen groups will start competing for their place. Blood will be
shed. Not ours, of course, but that of the gangsters. But bloodshed is
always a good excuse for the siloviki to entrench their positions.
Finally, the fourth consequence. The hardest one of all. The country is
already in a sweat. It genuinely believes that everything is going
fine, that the people and the party are one – but all around it sees
disorder, and subconsciously is looking for an embodiment of those
responsible for its own ills. This is happening without any help from
Georgia, but mass political, police and military hysteria over the
Georgian actions is affecting smouldering tensions, like throwing
alcohol on hot coals. It exploded in Kondopoga, long before any
evacuation. Now the risk level has risen exponentially. We are
continually told about the Orange threat level, but it’s long past time
to raise it to Brown.
To repeat – personally, I don’t really care how Georgia deals with its
own problems. What is important is how we deal with ours – how the
disproportionate reaction to Saakashvili’s lunacy affects the balance
of power in Russia.
Alexander Arkhangelsky is a columnist for Izvestia. He contributed this comment to RIA Novosti, where it first appeared.
October 6, 2006
Full-Scale War
By Alexander Arkhangelsky
Special to Russia Profile
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